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Sentences such as “The ship was sunk to collect the insurance” exhibit an unusual
form of anaphora, implicit control, where neither anaphor nor antecedent is audible.
The non-finite reason clause has an understood subject, PRO, that is anaphoric; here it
may be understood as naming the agent of the event of the host clause. Yet since the
host is a short passive, this agent is realized by no audible dependent. The putative
antecedent to PRO is therefore implicit, which it normally cannot be. What sorts of
representations subserve the comprehension of this dependency? Here we present four
self-paced reading time studies directed at this question. Previous work showed no
processing cost for implicit vs. explicit control, and took this to support the view that PRO
is linked syntactically to a silent argument in the passive. We challenge this conclusion
by reporting that we also find no processing cost for remote implicit control, as in: “The
ship was sunk. The reason was to collect the insurance.” Here the dependency crosses
two independent sentences, and so cannot, we argue, be mediated by syntax. Our
Experiments 1–4 examined the processing of both implicit (short passive) and explicit
(active or long passive) control in both local and remote configurations. Experiments 3
and 4 added either “3 days ago” or “just in order” to the local conditions, to control for
the distance between the passive and infinitival verbs, and for the predictability of the
reason clause, respectively. We replicate the finding that implicit control does not impose
an additional processing cost. But critically we show that remote control does not impose
a processing cost either. Reading times at the reason clause were never slower when
control was remote. In fact they were always faster. Thus, efficient processing of local
implicit control cannot show that implicit control is mediated by syntax; nor, in turn, that
there is a silent but grammatically active argument in passives.
Keywords: anaphora, implicit control, implicit argument, rationale clause, self-paced reading
BACKGROUND
Sometimes an aspect of speaker meaning has unclear provenance. Is it semantic or pragmatic? Is it
or is it not determined, that is, by the structural identity of the sentence itself? In such cases online
measures may help us find the source of the meaning, as the two routes to interpretation may take
measurably different paths.
One familiar example comes from verb phrase ellipsis, as in (2). After (1), the speaker of (2)
means that the Yankees traded an outfielder. But is this decided by the structural identity of his
sentence token?
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(1) The Red Sox traded an outfielder.
(2) The Yankees did too.
Many answer yes (Sag, 1976; Williams, 1977; Fiengo and May,
1994; Merchant, 2001). They say that this use of (2), unlike
others, has the verb phrase trade an outfielder, with all the
structure of the verb phrase in (1), just silent. Others answer no
(Dalrymple et al., 1991; Hardt, 1993; Ginzburg and Sag, 2000;
Culicover and Jackendoff, 2005). Every use of (2), they say, has
an unstructured verb phrase that simply means P, where P is a
free variable over properties. The value of that variable is then
decided “by context,” not by the sentence itself. On the first
account, the string in (2) is ambiguous between infinitely many
sentences, each with a different verb phrase and hence a different
meaning. On the second, it has a single meaning that is sensitive
to context. These two routes to interpretation—semantic vs.
pragmatic, disambiguation vs. anaphora, recovery of structure
vs. resolution of a variable—might involve different cognitive
processes, and might also register differently in some online
processing measure. If they do, that measure may provide some
evidence for which account is correct, a question that remains
contentious. Accordingly, a rich body of literature has pursued
this idea (Tanenhaus and Carlson, 1990; Shapiro and Hestvik,
1995; Frazier and Clifton, 2001, 2005; Martin and McElree, 2008;
Kertz, 2010; Yoshida et al., 2012; see Phillips and Parker, 2014 for
an overview).
We explore another area in this same light, namely implicit
control of reason clauses, on display when we use (3) to
mean (5).
(3) The candidates were interviewed to find the best person for
the job.
(4) Someone interviewed the candidates in order to find the best
person for the job.
(5) Someonek interviewed the candidates in order for themk to
find the best person for the job.
Both (3) and (4) have an infinitival reason clause with the verb
find, adjoined to a target clause with the verb interview. A reason
clause, or rationale clause (Faraci, 1974; Jones, 1985), offers a
teleological explanation of the fact expressed by its target clause.
Why were the candidates interviewed, according to this use of
(3)? Because then the interviewers might find the best person for
the job. The understood subject of a reason clause, called PRO,
may be construed anaphorically, as denoting a thing previously
mentioned or implied. Anaphora involving PRO is called control,
though we commit to no analysis with this term.When (3) is used
to mean (5), PRO names the interviewer entailed by the verb in
the target clause, interview. But the interviewer is named by no
audible dependent in that clause; (3) is a short passive, with no
by-phrase. So here control is implicit. Control is explicit when we
use (4) to mean (5). Now the interviewer is audibly realized, here
as the subject of an active target clause.
On the standard theory of implicit control (Roeper, 1987), the
relation is not pragmatic, but syntactic and therefore semantic.
Specifically, it is encoded in the context-invariant meaning of
the two-part sentence that combines the reason clause and its
target clause host; and this encoding goes by way of a syntactic
dependency, binding1, which effects sameness of reference.
Binding links PRO in the reason clause to a postulated silent
argument in the passive target clause, providing PRO with an
antecedent.
Semantically, the silent argument is linked to the deep-S role
of the verb: the semantic relation assigned to the subject of an
active clause with that verb. For interview, this is the role of
interviewer. Syntactically, the silent argument has one of two
representations, depending on the analysis of the passive. It
may be a formal feature of the verb, part of a feature array
that syntactically indexes certain semantic properties, perhaps a
“Theta Grid” (Stowell, 1981), “Argument Structure” (Grimshaw,
1990; Manning and Sag, 1998), or “Logical Structure” (van Valin,
1990). Or it may be a separate expression that combines with
the verb in syntax (Baker et al., 1989; Stanley, 2000). Either way,
the silent argument serves here to provide PRO with a formal
antecedent. This allows PRO to be bound, and hence for implicit
control to be fixed syntactically, and thus in the compositional
semantics. In this way implicit control is assimilated to the
paradigm cases of control, where PRO must be coreferent with
a particular argument in the next clause up. In (6) or (7), for
example, it is must be coreferent with the subject of the promise
or rob clauses, respectively.
(6) Lee heard Mo promise PRO to leave.
(7) Lee robbed Mo while PRO distracting her.
This theory has a good motive. Many restrictions on control of
reason clauses, or reason control, can be described in syntactic
terms (Keyser and Roeper, 1984; Roeper, 1987). When reason
control is explicit, the antecedent can be the subject but not the
object of its clause (Williams, 1974)2. Thus, we can use (8) but not
(9) to talk about how the sharks have their gills kept clean, since
these sharks is the subject in (8) but the object in (9). Conversely
only (9) implies that the parasites have gills.
(8) These sharks cover themselves with parasites to have their
gills kept clean.
(9) Parasites cover these sharks to have their gills kept clean.
The antecedent can also be a by-phrase, when the target clause is
a long passive. Thus, we can use (10) to convey that the Red Sox
hoped to acquire a better pitcher in trading two outfielders.
(10) Two outfielders were traded by the Red Sox to acquire a
better pitcher.
But the right conclusion is not that the antecedent must be
assigned the deep-S role of the verb in the target clause. This is not
1Binding of PRO is normally called control. But we use “control” more neutrally,
just to denote the resolution of PRO’s reference, whether or not this is decided by
binding.
2Control by objects is possible, however, for infinitival “purpose clauses” (Faraci,
1974; Williams, 1974; Bach, 1982; Jones, 1985). An example is Maria brought
Mary along to translate, where the translator is Mary, not Maria. Jones (1985)
distinguishes these from reason (rationale) clauses in three further ways, following
Williams (1974) and Faraci (1974). Only reason clauses have or permit in order to.
Only reason clauses can be preposed to sentence-initial position. And only purpose
clauses can have a gap in their VP, bound by an argument in the main clause, as
in Mary brought a pen to write with, where a pen binds a gap after with. But see
Whelpton (2002) for concerns about this taxonomy.
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necessary (Williams, 1974; Zubizaretta, 1982; Roeper, 1987), as
shown by (11), which can be used to mean that Lisa was arrested
so that shemight seem like a radical.
(11) Lisa was arrested just to seem like a radical.
The better conclusion is that explicit control must be by a subject,
so long as we presume that a by-phrase counts as a subject for at
least these purposes. Let us use the term S for an argument that
“counts as a subject” in this sense, so that reason control must be
by an S when explicit. Then we can describe implicit control in
analogous terms, if we link the deep-S role in a short passive to
a silent S argument, called “implicit” because it is grammatically
active. This is the standard theory.
Standard theory in hand, we have a syntactic account of
some cases where implicit control is impossible. Sentence (12)
describes the theft of a ship, and therefore entails a victim from
whom the ship was stolen. But we cannot use (12), it seems, to
say that the entailed victim was the intended collector of the
insurance, even if he hired the crook for this very purpose. On
the standard theory, this is because the role of victim is not
linked to an implicit S. And this conclusion is well-justified, since
the victim role is assigned to the subject in neither actives nor
passives with steal.
(12) A hired crook stole the ship to collect the insurance.
Middles, such as (13a), receive a more stipulative account. In a
middle as in a short passive, the deep-S role of the verb is assigned
to no audible dependent; no audible part of (13a) refers to killers,
for example. But with middles this role can never antecede a
reason clause PRO (Keyser and Roeper, 1984; Roeper, 1987;
Mauner and Koenig, 2000). After (13a), for example, we cannot
use (13b) to say that the winter survival of the killers explains why
prey animals kill easily in the autumn.
(13a) In the autumn the prey animals kill easily.
(13b) #to survive the winter without hunger.
To capture this, the standard theory stipulates a difference in
argument structure. In a middle, it says, the deep-S role is not
linked to an S, unlike in a passive.
These conclusions have broader implications beyond the
analysis of reason clauses, as they make it more plausible that an
argumentmay be silent but grammatically active (Stanley, 2002)3.
But the standard theory leaves several questions unanswered. It
suggests no reason why the implicit S in a passive does not always
function as a subject, in relation to all types of adjunct clauses
(Vinet, 1988; Iwata, 1999; Landau, 2000), not just reason clauses.
By hypothesis (14) has a silent S in the role of thief, and yet we
cannot use (14) to mean that my wallet was stolen while the thief
was distracting me, letting this implicit S control the non-finite
temporal adjunct.
3There is a strong case for silent arguments with an anaphoric or “definite”
(Fillmore, 1986) interpretation (Partee, 1989; Condoravdi and Gawron, 1996).
But the silent argument in a short passive would not be anaphoric or definite.
Its interpretation would be equivalent to a narrow-scope existential quantifier:
“The candidates were interviewed carefully by someone.” And the case for such
arguments is much weaker (Williams, 2015).
(14) My wallet was stolen while distracting me.
The standard theory is also silent on why implicit control is not
available to the deep-S role of every passive clause. The meaning
that is unavailable to (14) is also unavailable to (13) (Williams,
2015). Yet (15a) is a passive, not a middle, and so should have an
implicit S in the role of killer.
(15a) In the autumn the prey animals are killed easily
(15b) #to survive the winter without hunger.
Nor can the standard theory accommodate data like (16)
(Williams, 1985, 2015; Lasnik, 1988). Sentence (16) can be used
to convey that a young girl cut the ribbon so that the organizers of
the event might acquire the support of female voters (Williams,
2015). Yet in a clause with cut, there is no argument that stands
for organizers of the cutting, as distinct from the cutters.
(16) A young girl cut the ribbon just to acquire the support of
female voters.
Finally, the standard theory cannot account for what we call
remote control, to which we turn in a moment.
Given these doubts, we should welcome additional evidence
for the standard theory; and some has been offered in the
previous psycholinguistic literature. In a series of stop-making-
sense and self-paced reading time studies, Mauner et al. (1995)
compared implicit with explicit control of reason clauses. They
did so by comparing reason clauses following active, full passive,
short passive and intransitive target clauses (15–18).
(17) Someone sank the ship to collect the insurance.
(18) The ship was sunk by someone to collect the insurance.
(19) The ship was sunk to collect the insurance.
(20) The ship sank to collect the insurance.
No differences in acceptability judgments or in reading times
were observed in the reason clause in conditions (15–17),
but significantly slower reading times and more “unacceptable”
responses were observed following the intransitive (20). Mauner
and colleagues took these results to support the standard theory
of implicit control, on the basis of the following reasoning.
First, something like the standard theory of explicit control
was assumed: in active examples like (17), PRO is locally
bound by the surface subject of the target clause. It was
then assumed that finding similar processing profiles for two
interpretive dependencies—such as implicit vs. explicit control—
would provide evidence that the same mechanisms are at work
in resolving them both. Since explicit control by the surface
subject of an active target clause is supposed to be mediated
syntactically, and since no behavioral differences were observed
between explicit (15, 16) and implicit control conditions (19),
these earlier results were taken to support the standard view that
implicit control is syntactic binding of PRO by a silent argument
in the short passive.
Although Mauner and colleagues’ results have been taken to
constitute important evidence in favor of the standard view of
implicit control, this interpretation relies on the assumptions
outlined above. In the current study, we test these assumptions
further by examining the case of remote control. Prior studies
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considered only local control, where the target and reason clauses
are syntactically dependent, forming a single sentence. In remote
control (Higgins, 1973; Sag and Pollard, 1991; Williams, 2015),
as in (21), the two clauses are independent, in two separate
sentences. But we can still use (21) to mean (5).
(21) The candidates were interviewed. The goal was to find the
best person for the job.
(5) Someonek interviewed the candidates in order for themk to
find the best person for the job.
In remote control, the infinitival clause is the complement to
an equative (or specificational) copula, in a sentence that is
separate from the target clause. The subject of the target clause is
something like the goal, the reason, or the purpose, a description
with a relational noun.We understand that, here, this description
is used to refer to a relation that is directed at the target fact,
taking the goal in (21), for example, to refer to the goal of
interviewing the candidates.
Crucially, remote control shows exactly the same restrictions
as local control (Williams, 2015). Among others, the contrasts
in (1–13) are all preserved when control is remote. (8′) and (9′)
show that subjects, but not objects, can be implicit controllers in
remote configurations; only (9′) implies that parasites have gills.
(8′) These sharks cover themselves in parasites. The goal is to
have their gills kept clean.
(9′) Parasites cover these sharks. The goal is to have their gills
kept clean.
And, as with (12) above, it is not possible to use (12′) to mean that
the hired crook stole the ship so that his employers could collect
the payout.
(12′) A hired crook stole the ship. The reason was to collect the
insurance.
Yet here these patterns cannot be explained in terms of syntactic
binding. Binding cannot cross independent sentences, and the
reason clause, when remote, is syntactically separate from
its target. Conceivably—though we do not think that this is
correct, for reasons we discuss elsewhere (Green and Williams,
in preparation)—the copular clause has hidden structure that
conceals a local (same-sentence) binder for PRO, one that is itself
anaphoric to an S in the target clause4. But even if it did, the
anaphoric relation between this local binder and its antecedent in
the target clause would still be intersentential. Hence, whatever
it is that underlies the interpretive dependency between PRO
and the implied interviewer in (21), it cannot be syntactic
binding.
The anaphora in (21) must therefore be pragmatic. PRO in
a remote reason clause—or, on the alternative that we reject, its
hidden local binder—must function not like a bound pronoun,
but like a free pronoun or definite description. In turn, the limits
4For example, the subject of the copular clause might contain a silenced genitive
pronoun, [his] reason, or a silent relative clause elided under identity with the target
clause, the reason [that the candidates were interviewed]. Then the clause would to
be restructured at an unpronounced level of syntax, so that the silent binder is in a
local relation to PRO. On the special grammar of copular clauses, see the review in
Mikkelsen (2011).
on its interpretation cannot be explained directly in terms of
structure in the target clause. Rather, its domain of referencemust
be highly restricted, in terms that only correlate, partially and
indirectly, with subjecthood in the target clause5. Examples such
as (12) suggest that a notion of responsibility may be relevant:
perhaps PRO in a reason clause, as a matter of the meaning of
the construction, ranges only over parties viewed as explanatorily
responsible for the fact it is meant to explain, a class that may
but need not include the individual in the deep-S role to the
event of the verb (often, its agent)6. However, the grammatical
analysis of remote control is beyond the scope of the current
work. Here, the key observation is just that the restrictions on
local and remote control appear to be identical. Since remote
control must be pragmatically mediated, this weakens the motive
for a semantic, hence syntactic, account of local control, and
at the same time provides a new means of examining the
extent to which reading time measures provide support for
the syntactic account. If the standard theory is correct, then
different mechanismsmust be at work in resolution of local (one-
sentence) and remote (two-sentence) control: syntactic binding
and something like free pronoun interpretation, respectively.
On the other hand, if what we now call the pragmatic theory
is correct, then something like free pronoun interpretation
supports resolution not only of remote control, but also of local
control.
In the current study, we investigate these alternative
hypotheses by examining processing measures in a series of
self-paced reading time studies comparing remote and local
reason clauses, with and without explicit antecedents. The
predictions are the following. Since the standard theory proposes
different mechanisms for resolving local and remote control,
and the pragmatic theory proposes the same mechanism, the
standard theory predicts differences in the processing of local
and remote control, while the pragmatic theory does not. These
differences might be realized in several ways. First, following
the logic in Mauner et al. (1995), implicitness may be costly
in forming pragmatic dependencies (because a referent must
be inferred), but not costly in forming syntactic dependencies
(because binding to the syntactic argument position proceeds in
exactly the same way whether it is audible or not). Given this
assumption, the standard theory would predict in the current
experiments an interaction between implicitness and distance:
an effect of implicitness should be present in the pragmatically
mediated remote conditions but not in the syntactically mediated
local conditions. Second, pragmatically mediated or syntactically
mediated dependencies are likely to differ in processing cost
5A referential dependency that is intersentential cannot be syntactic, but it may
still be sensitive to structural properties of the antecedent. VP Ellipsis is sensitive
to voice, for example, and pronominal reference may be sensitive to gender class.
Neither of these cases is itself a good model for remote control. But it remains
coherent to claim both that PRO in a reason clause is a free anaphor, and that its
resolution is sensitive to something like subjecthood. We return to this in passing
in the General Discussion.
6Constructional restrictions on the domain of a pronoun are not in the standard
semantic toolkit, and therefore muchmore would need to be said. For thoughts see
Landau (2000) and Williams (2015), which refine a suggestion in Farkas (1988),
with roots in Williams (1974). Also see Whelpton (2002) in opposition, and the
discussion in Sag and Pollard (1991).
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independent of implicitness because they involve reference to
different kinds of memory representations. Therefore, in the
current experiments, the standard theory could also predict
a main effect of distance, but the direction of this difference
depends on the linking hypothesis assumed. If syntactic binding
is more costly to resolve than free pronoun interpretation, then
the effect of implicitness should be larger in remote control.
If free pronoun interpretation is more costly, then the effect
of implicitness should be larger in local control. As previous
psycholinguistic work does not provide clear predictions about
which should be more costly (see Frazier and Clifton, 2000,
for discussion), either could be taken to be consistent with the
standard theory, although it could also be the case that binding
and free pronoun interpretation do not differ fundamentally in
processing cost (Cunnings et al., 2014).
The pragmatic theory does not predict any difference in the
costs of implicitness in remote vs. local control. If we observed
no such differences, this could be due to the fact that local and
remote control are both mediated by the same kind of pragmatic
mechanism. However, such a conclusion would be too strong
here. It might be that reading times in particular are not a
sensitive enough measure to detect differences between local and
remote control that other measures might detect. Or it could be
that processing cost is more generally not a reliable diagnostic of
whether a dependency is semantically or pragmatically mediated.
However, it is important to remember that Mauner et al.’s (1995)
finding of no processing cost for local implicit vs. explicit control
is one of the key pieces of evidence currently taken to support
the standard theory, and that reading time was one of the online
measures used in that study. Skepticism about the ability of self-
paced reading to detect differences in processing of local and
remote control would thus undermine earlier arguments in favor
of the standard theory. These relied on the premise that, in
fact, behavioral measures could reflect differences in processing
as a function of whether a dependency was semantically or
pragmatically mediated. Thus, if we observe no differences in
processing of local vs. remote reason clauses, we can at the very
least conclude that these earlier results do not in fact provide
evidence for the standard account.
EXPERIMENTS
Experiment 1
The goal of Experiment 1 was to test whether differences obtain
in processing of local vs. remote control, or between implicit
and explicit control within local vs. remote configurations.
Experiment 1 manipulated explicitness with passive sentences
that varied in the presence or absence of a by-phrase that
explicitly named the agent of the event described by the
passive. Observation of differences in processing of remote
and local control, or between implicit and explicit control
in local vs. remote configurations, would provide support for
the standard theory. Should we observe no such differences,
this would either raise a challenge for the standard theory,
or undermine previous arguments in its favor, as discussed
above.
Methods and Materials
Participants
Participants were 38 native speakers of English from the
University of Maryland community. Participants gave informed
consent, and received credit in an introductory linguistics course
or were compensated $5 for their participation in the experiment.
All participants were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. The
self-paced reading task lasted for approximately 30min.
Materials
Sentences were created by combining a finite passive clause
with a non-finite reason clause. In a 2 × 2 design, stimuli
varied in whether the target clause contained an overt antecedent
for the understood subject of the reason clause (explicitness),
and in whether the target and reason clauses were syntactically
independent (distance). In conditions labeled implicit, the target
clause was a short passive and therefore lacked an overt
antecedent for PRO. In conditions labeled explicit, the target
clause was a passive with a by-phrase describing the agent of the
event, which served as the antecedent of PRO. The dependency
was local when the reason clause was syntactically an adjunct
of the target clause. The dependency was remote when the two
clauses were syntactically independent, the reason clause being
hosted by a copular clause in a separate sentence. An example set
of materials is provided in Table 1.
In order to control the position of the reason clause across
explicit and implicit conditions, we substituted a temporal
adjunct, such as for several hours, in the implicit conditions in
place of the by-phrase. Our materials were also crafted to strongly
favor interpreting PRO as the satisfier(s) of the deep-S role in the
target clause. To this end, we controlled several properties across
item sets. First, the reason clause always expressed a property
that can be satisfied by people, but not by facts or events. While
people can find the best employees for a job, for example, facts or
events cannot. This eliminated the possibility, otherwise readily
available (Williams, 1985; Lasnik, 1988), of resolving PRO to
the fact or event named by the target clause itself. This can
happen in (22), which can be used to say that the candidates
were interviewed because interviewing them might make a good
impression.
(22) Candidates were interviewed to make a good impression.
Second, our passive target clauses mostly had subjects that
were semantically implausible as subjects for the reason clause,
lowering the chance that they would be taken to antecede
PRO. Third, in general our passive target clauses also resisted
being read as “adjectival passives,” as in the shoes are polished.
This matters, since adjectival passives do not readily support
implicit control by the deep-S role of their verb root. And
finally, our target clauses never contained first-person, second-
person or impersonal pronouns. This lowered the likelihood,
however small, that PRO was read as logophoric or impersonal,
like English impersonal one, denoting a group that shares the
interlocutors’ perspective.
Twenty-four sets of four items in these conditions were
distributed across four lists in a Latin square design. 96 filler
sentences were also included, such that each participant read
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TABLE 1 | Experiment 1 materials.
Regions of analysis
Pre-target 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Post-target
ex. loc: The candidates were interviewed by the committee to find the best person for the job.
im. loc: The candidates were interviewed three weeks ago to find the best person for the job.
ex. rem: The candidates were interviewed by the committee. The reason was to find the best person for the job.
im. rem: The candidates were interviewed three weeks ago. The reason was to find the best person for the job.
a total of 120 sentences. Approximately half of the fillers
were one-sentence fillers. The other half were two-sentence
fillers, roughly matching the 1:1 ratio of one- to two-sentence
items in the main experimental stimuli. Some of the fillers
involved adjectival passives and prepositional to in order to
reduce the likelihood of within-task effects. Such constructions
are syntactically very similar to our experimental items, but
are differentiated semantically. Their inclusion was intended as
a distraction, to make it less likely that readers would gain
familiarity during the task with handling reason clauses.
Each sentence was followed by a comprehension question.
Comprehension questions varied in whether they targeted
information in the target clause, in the reason clause, or
concerning the relation between target and reason clause. This
reduced the likelihood of participants developing superficial
reading strategies during the task.
Procedure
Sentences were displayed on a desktop PC in a moving-window
self-paced reading display using the Linger software package
(Doug Rohde, MIT). Each sentence initially appeared on a black
screen masked by white dashes, with spacing and punctuation
intact. Participants revealed the first word by pressing the space-
bar on a keyboard. Subsequent words appeared in place of their
respective dashes non-cumulatively as participants pressed the
space-bar. The order of presentation of target and filler items was
randomized for each participant. Participants were instructed
to read the sentences carefully and for understanding but at
their normal pace. Before the beginning of the experiment,
participants were able to gain familiarity with the task with
four practice items. Each sentence was followed by a yes/no
comprehension question. Incorrect answers to comprehension
questions elicited onscreen feedback. The entire procedure took
approximately 30min.
Data analysis
The minimum comprehension question accuracy required for
inclusion of a participant’s data in the analysis was 80%. Data
from two participants were excluded due to comprehension
question inaccuracy, resulting in a final dataset of 36 participants.
Statistical analysis was performed in regions 1–10, where
region 1 was the first region in which conditions differed
(the region beginning the by-phrase or temporal adjunct prior
to the reason clause), and region 7 was the to region that
began the critical reason clause. We used mixed-effects linear
regressions to assess the reliability of the effects associated with
the experimental factors. The effects of explicitness and distance
on reading times were tested using linear mixed effects models
in R (Bates et al., 2014; R Core Team, 2014), and p-values were
obtained using lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 2014), which uses
Satterwaithe approximations to calculate degrees of freedom.
Note that regions 4–6 (The reason was) were only included in the
remote conditions, and therefore tests in these regions necessarily
examined only the effect of explicitness.
Reading times above 2000ms were excluded. This resulted in
loss of 0.16% of the data. Reading times were then converted to a
log scale for statistical analysis. The fixed effects in themodel were
the factors explicitness (explicit vs. implicit), distance (local vs.
remote), and their interaction. In addition to these fixed-effects,
participants, and items were crossed, starting with random
intercepts and slopes, and removing one level of complexity until
the model converged with correlations of less than 0.9 in random
effects in all regions and experiments described here, following
the recommendations of Baayen et al. (2008) and Barr et al.
(2013). This resulted in a model including random intercepts for
subjects and items, but no random slopes.
Results
Mean comprehension question accuracy for experimental
stimuli across participants and items was 92% (range across
conditions: 91–93%), suggesting that participants were successful
in comprehending the main experimental stimuli.
Logged reading times are plotted in Figure 1, with significant
effects summarized in Table 2. Unexpectedly, in self-paced
reading times, the most prominent effect we observe was a
slowdown for the explicit local condition relative to the other
four conditions. Results of the linear mixed effects models are
presented in Table 2. In regions 1–3, immediately following
the short passive, we found no significant main effects of
either distance (whether the reason clause is local or remote)
or explicitness (whether the target clause is a short or long
passive) and no interactions, although the explicit local condition
was already numerically slowest by region 3. There was also
no significant difference between the remote explicit and
implicit conditions in regions 4–6 (The reason was), although
reading times for the explicit condition were numerically longer.
However, at the infinitival to, region (9), we observed significant
main effects of explicitness (β = −0.14, t = −6.0, p < 0.001)
and distance (β = −0.09, t = −3.7, p < 0.001) and a significant
interaction between explicitness and distance (β = 0.09, t = 2.8,
p < 0.01). Follow-up pairwise comparisons indicated that this
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FIGURE 1 | Mean logged reading times (ms) for all four conditions in regions of interest in Experiment 1.
TABLE 2 | Experiment 1 results.
Region Factors Estimate S.E. t-value p-value
Explicitness −0.089 0.024 −3.73 <0.001
7 Distance −0.143 0.024 −5.99 <0.001
To Explicitness × Distance 0.094 0.034 2.77 0.006
Explicitness −0.08 0.024 −3.31 <0.001
8 Distance −0.093 0.024 −3.39 <0.001
Find Explicitness × Distance 0.054 0.034 1.57 0.116
Explicitness −0.048 0.025 −1.92 0.055
9 Distance −0.061 0.025 −2.43 0.015
the Explicitness × Distance 0.024 0.036 0.68 0.498
interaction was driven by a significant effect of explicitness in
local conditions (β = −0.09, t = −3.3, p < 0.001) but not in
remote conditions (β = 0.004, t = 0.2, p > 0.2). In short, there
appears to be a strong slowing effect of the by-phrase on reading
times at the infinitival in the reason clause, but only in one-
sentence conditions. In region 8 we observed the same pattern
numerically, but here the interaction did not reach significance
(main effect of distance: β = -0.09, t = -3.9, p < 0.001; main effect
of explicitness: β = −0.08, t = −3.3, p < 0.001; interaction
between explicitness and distance: β = 0.05, t = 1.6, p = 0.1).
These differences diminished following the main verb in regions
9 and 10, although we observed a main effect of distance in
region 9 (β = −0.06, t = −2.4, p < 0.05) and a marginal
main effect of explicitness in region 10 (β = 0.02, t = 0.46,
p > 0.2).
Discussion
The goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate differences in
the cost of resolving implicit vs. explicit control of reason
clauses, in local and remote configurations. In this experiment
we used a comparison between short and long passives to
manipulate whether the antecedent to PRO was implicit or
explicit, respectively. The main effect we observed is unexpected
according to either the standard theory or the pragmatic theory:
the local explicit condition was slower at the beginning of the
reason clause than the other three conditions. The logic in
Mauner et al. (1995) would predict the longest reading times
for the remote implicit condition, which requires the costly
operation of inferring an antecedent for PRO. A more generic
version of the standard theory would predict only a main effect
of distance. What, then, can explain our results? Why were the
longest reading times observed when the antecedent was both
explicit, and closer to the position at which the dependency is
resolved?
Because this pattern contradicts the predictions of all theories
about implicit arguments that we are aware of, we conclude
that the slowdown for the explicit local condition is most likely
due to an independent factor. In particular, we suggest that
this slowdown is an index of continued processing difficulty
elicited by the preceding by-phrase. Normally by-phrases carry
narrow focus. That is, we would normally read our long passive
example—The candidates were interviewed by the committee—
with prosodic prominence on committee, contrasting the
committee with other possible interviewers that might be
presently relevant. It has been observed that linguistically focused
items elicit slower reading times (Lowder and Gordon, 2015).
Furthermore, this effect may be particularly pronounced in the
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current experiment, because the interpretation of the reason-
clause is sensitive to focus (Dretske, 1972): the reason why the
candidates were interviewed, for example, may not be the reason
why they were interviewed by the committee. As for why the effect
of the by-phrase does not obtain in the remote conditions, this is
plausibly explained by the availability of more time for processing
the focused by-phrase prior to the focus-sensitive reason clause
during the intervening The reason was segment in the remote
conditions. Indeed, reading times for the explicit condition were
numerically larger during this region.
If this is the correct explanation for the unexpected effects we
observe in Experiment 1, then long passives are not ideal as a
baseline condition of explicit control, if we want to isolate the
specific costs of implicit control. Therefore, in our subsequent
experiments, we instead use active transitive clauses for this
purpose.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 tested the effect of explicitness in local vs.
remote control configurations by comparing short and long
passives, but we found that the by-phrases in long passives
introduce independent reading time costs. Experiment 2
therefore manipulated explicitness by comparing short passives
with active transitive clauses instead.
Methods and Materials
Participants
Participants were 36 native speakers of English from the
University of Maryland community. Participants gave informed
consent, and received credit in an introductory linguistics course
or were compensated $5 for their participation in the experiment.
All participants were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. The
self-paced reading task lasted for approximately 30min.
Materials
Twenty-four sets of four target sentences again varied in a 2 ×
2 design with the factors explicitness and distance. However,
explicitness is now manipulated by comparing control by short
passives with control by active transitive clauses, as shown in
Table 3. The same fillers and comprehension questions were used
as in the earlier experiments. An example set is provided in
Table 3.
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 2 was the same as the procedure
for Experiment 1.
Data analysis
Comprehension question accuracy was above 80% for all
participants. Statistical analysis was performed in regions 1–9,
where region 1 was two regions prior to the critical word to in
the local conditions and region 6 was the to region that began
the critical reason clause. Analysis procedures were the same
as described for Experiment 1. The exclusion of reading times
above 2000ms resulted in a loss of 0.2% of the total data. Note
that regions 3–5 (The reason was) were only included in the
remote conditions, and therefore tests in these regions necessarily
examined only the effect of explicitness.
Results
The mean comprehension question accuracy for experimental
items across participants and items was 96% (range across
conditions: 95–97%), suggesting that participants were successful
in comprehending the main experimental stimuli.
Logged reading times are plotted in Figure 2, with significant
effects summarized in Table 4. In the regions preceding the
reason clause (1–5), the only significant effect observed was
slower reading times for the explicit remote condition than
the implicit remote condition for the first word of the second
sentence, The (β = 0.08, t = 2.1, p < 0.05). Although the reason
for this difference is not clear, we note that the conditions come
back together in the next region and are very tightly matched
prior to the beginning of the critical reason clause.
At the infinitival to (region 6), a main effect of distance was
observed, with slower reading times for local conditions (β =
0.06, t = 2.2, p < 0.05), and we also observed an interaction of
explicitness and distance (β = 0.09, t = 2.4, p < 0.05). However,
this interaction was not in the direction predicted by the standard
theory; rather than implicitness requiring costly inference in the
pragmatically-mediated remote condition, we observed a cost of
implicitness in the local conditions. Pairwise comparisons show
that the implicit local condition was significantly slower than
the explicit local condition (β = 0.08, t = 2.4, p < 0.05),
but no differences in reading times were observed for implicit
and explicit remote conditions (p > 0.2). A similar pattern was
observed at the subsequent verb (region 7), with a main effect of
distance (β = 0.06, t = 2.1, p < 0.05) and a marginal interaction
between explicitness and distance (β = 0.06, t = 1.7, p = 0.09).
At the region following the verb (region 8), no main effects were
observed, but we continued to observe an interaction between
explicitness and distance, in the same direction (β = 0.08, t =
2.1, p < 0.05). No other significant main or interaction effects
were observed in the regions of analysis.
TABLE 3 | Experiment 2 materials.
Regions of analysis
Pre-target 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Post-target
ex. loc: The committee interviewed the candidates to find the best person for the job.
im. loc: The candidates were interviewed to find the best person for the job.
ex. rem: The committee interviewed the candidates. The reason was to find the best person for the job.
im. rem: The candidates were interviewed. The reason was to find the best person for the job.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean logged reading times (ms) for all four conditions in regions of interest in Experiment 2.
TABLE 4 | Experiment 2 results.
Region Factors Estimate S.E. t-value p-value
Explicitness −0.02 0.028 −0.71 0.477
6 Distance 0.062 0.028 2.21 0.027
to Explicitness × Distance 0.096 0.04 2.42 0.016
Explicitness −0.0001 0.027 −0.004 0.997
7 Distance 0.057 0.027 2.13 0.033
find Explicitness × Distance 0.065 0.038 1.71 0.088
Explicitness −0.033 0.025 −1.32 0.186
8 Distance 0.013 0.025 0.52 0.607
the Explicitness × Distance 0.076 0.036 2.13 0.034
Discussion
The standard theory requires different mechanisms for resolving
local and remote control (binding vs. contextual interpretation)
and the pragmatic theory proposes the same mechanism
(contextual interpretation). Hence, the standard theory predicts
differences in the processing of local and remote control, while
the pragmatic theory does not. As noted above, these differences
might take several forms.
First, Mauner et al. (1995) suggest that syntactic resolution
of PRO should have the same processing cost whether the
antecedent is explicit or implicit, but that pragmatic resolution
of PRO should require costly inference when the antecedent
is implicit. According to these assumptions, if local control
reflects a syntactically-mediated dependency and remote control
reflects a pragmatically-mediated dependency, an interaction
between distance and explicitness should be observed such that
explicitness has an effect on processing in remote control but
not in local control. In Experiment 2 we observed a significant
interaction between distance and explicitness at the reason clause,
but in the opposite direction: the implicit condition appeared to
be costly in the local cases and not the remote cases. This pattern
is not predicted by either the standard theory or the pragmatic
theory, and it also differs from Mauner et al.’s earlier results in
which no cost of explicitness was observed for local control of
reason clauses.
We hypothesize that the slowdown in the implicit local
condition may not reflect the cost of implicitness per se, but may
rather have been due to the time course of processes elicited by
the current materials. We assume that constructing the syntactic
and thematic representation associated with the passive may take
time (Chow et al., 2015). If this process is not complete by the
time the reason clause is encountered, which may have been
the case in the local conditions, resolution of PRO will not be
immediately possible, causing temporary processing difficulty.
However, in the remote conditions, the extra interveningmaterial
(The reason was) may have acted as a “buffer,” providing enough
time for the passive sentence to be fully processed by the time the
reason clause was encountered. Experiments 3 and 4 include such
a buffer in both local and remote conditions and show that this
eliminates the cost of implicit control in the local conditions.
Second, the standard theory assumes that local and remote
control are mediated by different mechanisms (contextual
interpretation and syntactic binding, respectively), and this
difference in representational encoding could be reflected
online in behavioral measures such as reading time as
differences between local and remote configurations that are
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independent of explicitness—in other words, a main effect of
distance.
In Experiment 2, we observed a significant main effect of
distance at the infinitival and the verb in the reason clause,
with faster reading times in remote conditions. That is, readers
appear to be faster to process a reason clause that is syntactically
independent of its target clause as compared to a reason clause
whose target clause is a syntactic co-dependent within the
same sentence. We refer to this as the remote speed-up effect
of Experiment 2. These results are thus consistent with the
predictions of the standard theory: contextual interpretation of
PRO in a reason clause is less costly than syntactic binding.
However, there are also several alternative explanations of the
remote speed-up effect, which we explore in Experiments 3 and
4. First, in remote conditions the presence of the reason was
provided readers with extra time to process the target clause. If
target clause was not fully interpreted when the reason clause
appeared, processing difficulty would naturally ensue. Second,
this phrase also provided readers with a cue that an infinitival
reason clause may be on its way. This might facilitate resolution
of PRO, and lead to faster reading times in the remote conditions.
Experiment 3 tested the first possibility by adding a temporal
modifier to the target clause in local conditions to better match
the time course with the remote conditions. Experiment 4 tested
the second possibility by adding a cue to the reason clause in the
local condition (just in order) to parallel the reason was in the
remote conditions.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 used the same design as Experiment 2 but added
an intervening temporal modifier to the local conditions in
order to match the distance between the target clause and the
reason clause across local and remote conditions. If the overall
slowdown for local conditions and the cost of implicitness
for local conditions in Experiment 2 were because the target
clause had not been fully processed by the time the reason
clause was encountered, these differences should be eliminated
in Experiment 3.
Methods and Materials
Participants
Participants were 39 native speakers of English from the
University of Maryland community, none of whom had taken
part in the previous experiments. They either received credit in
an introductory linguistics course, or were compensated $10. All
participants were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. The
self-paced reading task lasted for approximately 30min.
Materials
Twenty-four sets of four target sentences again varied in a 2 × 2
design with the factors explicitness and distance. However, to
match the amount of time available for processing between the
verbs in the local and remote conditions, buffer material was
included in the local target clauses, usually a temporal modifier
like 3 weeks ago, as shown in Table 5. The same fillers and
comprehension questions were used as in the earlier experiments.
An example set of materials is provided in Table 5.
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 3 was the same as the procedure
for Experiments 1 and 2.
Data analysis
The minimum comprehension question accuracy required for
inclusion of a participant’s data in the analysis was 80%. Data
from three participants were excluded due to comprehension
question inaccuracy, resulting in a final dataset of 36
participants.
Statistical analysis was the same as described above for
Experiment 2, except that because of the additional material
in the local conditions, all nine regions of interest could now
be analyzed with the full model including both distance and
explicitness. Reading times above 2000ms were again excluded,
resulting in a loss of 0.23% of the total data.
Results
Mean comprehension question accuracy for experimental
stimuli across participants and items was 91% (range across
conditions: 89–92%), suggesting that participants were successful
in comprehending the main experimental stimuli.
Logged reading times are plotted in Figure 3, with significant
effects summarized in Table 6. The reason clause began in region
6, and we observed no significant main or interaction effects
in preceding regions 1–4. However, region 5, just prior to the
infinitival (was in the remote conditions and the last word of
the temporal modifier in the remote conditions) showed a strong
main effect of distance (β = 0.1, t = 3.7, p < 0.001) due
to faster reading times in remote conditions, and a marginal
main effect of explicitness (β = 0.05, t = 1.9, p = 0.06) that
appeared to be due to slower reading times in the explicit local
condition.
TABLE 5 | Experiment 3 materials.
Regions of the analysis
Pre-target 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Post-target
ex. loc: The committee interviewed the candidates three weeks ago to find the best person for the job.
im. loc: The candidates were interviewed three weeks ago to find the best person for the job.
ex. rem: The committee interviewed the candidates. The reason was to find the best person for the job.
im. rem: The candidates were interviewed. The reason was to find the best person for the job.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean logged reading times (ms) for all four conditions in regions of interest in Experiment 3.
TABLE 6 | Experiment 3 results.
Region Factors Estimate S.E. t-value p-value
Explicitness −0.054 0.028 −1.9 0.058
5 Distance −0.104 0.028 −3.67 0.0003
ago/was Explicitness × Distance 0.057 0.04 1.44 0.151
Explicitness 0.026 0.026 1 0.318
6 Distance 0.065 0.026 −2.5 0.013
to Explicitness × Distance −0.013 0.037 −0.35 0.724
Explicitness −0.023 0.025 −0.95 0.344
7 Distance −0.048 0.025 −1.95 0.051
find Explicitness × Distance 0.03 0.035 0.86 0.388
At the infinitival to and the subsequent verb (region 6–7),
we see no sign of any main effects or interactions involving
explicitness, but we again observe faster reading times in the
remote conditions (region 6: β = 0.07, t = 2.5, p < 0.05,
region 7: β = 0.05, t = 2.0, p = 0.05). Importantly, we
observe no effect of implicitness within the local conditions,
in contrast with Experiment 2. That is, in both local and
remote conditions, readers are just as fast to process reason
clauses whether they follow a short passive or an active target
clause.
Discussion
Experiment 3 was designed to better understand two differences
between local and remote conditions that were observed in
Experiment 2. First, Experiment 2 showed an interaction between
distance and explicitness at the reason clause, such that the
local conditions showed a cost of implicitness but the remote
conditions did not. Because this pattern was predicted by neither
the standard theory nor the pragmatic theory, we suspected that it
reflected the fact that the passive had not been fully processed by
the time the reason clause appeared in the local condition. The
results of Experiment 3 are consistent with this hypothesis, as
when a temporal modifier was added as a “buffer” between the
target clause and the reason clause, no cost of implicitness was
observed at the reason clause in the local conditions. This result
is thus in keeping with earlier findings concerning local control
(Mauner et al., 1995).
Importantly, neither Experiment 2 nor Experiment 3 showed
any evidence of one possible pattern of processing differences
between local and remote control that might have been predicted
by the standard theory. If, as suggested by Mauner et al. (1995),
resolving control when the antecedent is implicit requires costly
inference when control is pragmatically mediated but not when it
is syntactically mediated, then the standard theory would predict
a cost of implicitness for remote control and not for local control.
This prediction is not borne out by the current results, which
show no sign of processing cost for implicitness in the remote
control conditions.
In Experiment 2 we also observed overall faster reading times
at the reason clause in remote control compared to local control.
This pattern would also be consistent with the standard theory
if the processes involved in resolving the pragmatic dependency
are faster or less effortful than the processes involved in resolving
the syntactic dependency. However, this pattern could also have
simply been due to the fact that the extra intervening material
between the target and reason clause in the remote conditions
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(the reason was) might have provided more time to fully process
the target clause.
The results of Experiment 3 appear to argue against this
alternative explanation, because when we control for timing
between the local and remote conditions, we continue to
observe a strong effect of distance in the reason clause, once
again with faster reading times in remote as compared to local
reason clauses. However, we also noted another alternative
explanation for the facilitated processing of remote control
observed here, which is that the content of the intervening
material in the reason was provided a predictive semantic cue for
the upcoming infinitival reason clause. The temporal modifier
included in the local conditions in Experiment 3 provided
additional processing time, but did not include this kind of
semantic cue. In support of this explanation, in Experiment 3
significantly longer reading times were also observed for local
relative to remote conditions in the region immediately prior to
the reason clause. This early effect cannot be driven by control
per se, but could be explained if the predictability of the reason
was sped up reaction times in the remote condition relative
to the less predictable temporal modifier (e.g., 3 weeks ago) in
the local condition. Experiment 4 was designed to address this
remaining discrepancy by making the material immediately
preceding the reason clause equally predictable across
conditions.
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 used the same design as Experiments 2 and 3 but
used the phrase just in order to in the local conditions such
that both local and remote conditions contained a semantic
cue that could be used to predict or prepare for the upcoming
reason clause. If the faster reading times in the remote conditions
observed in Experiments 2 and 3 were due to the presence of the
semantic cue The reason was, this difference in processing time
should be eliminated in Experiment 4.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 38 native speakers of English from the
University of Maryland community, none of whom had taken
part in the previous experiments. They received credit in an
introductory linguistics course for participating. All participants
were naïve to the purpose of the experiment until after
participating, when an explanation was provided. The self-
paced reading task lasted for approximately 30min. The task
was performed as part of a 1 h session involving an unrelated
experiment.
Materials
Twenty-four sets of four target sentences again varied in a 2 × 2
design with the factors explicitness and distance. However, we
included just in order in the local conditions in Experiment 4
to match not only the time course, but also the predictiveness
of the upcoming reason clause in remote and local conditions.
The same fillers and comprehension questions were used as in
the earlier experiments. An example set of materials is provided
in Table 7.
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 4 was the same as that described
above.
Data analysis
The minimum comprehension question accuracy required for
inclusion of a participant’s data in the analysis was 80%. Data
from one participant were excluded due to comprehension
question inaccuracy. Data from one participant who was not a
native speaker of English were also excluded.
Statistical analysis was the same as described above for
Experiment 3. Reading times above 2000ms were excluded,
resulting in a loss of 0.28% of the total data.
Results
Mean comprehension question accuracy for experimental stimuli
across participants and items was 93% (range 92–95%),
suggesting that participants were successful in comprehending
the main experimental stimuli.
Logged reading times are plotted in Figure 4, with significant
effects summarized in Table 8. In the regions preceding the
reason clause (1–5) we observed no significant differences except
for a main effect of distance due to slower reading times in the
remote conditions in region 3 (β = 0.1, t = 3.1, p < 0.01), which
corresponded to the sentence-initial determiner the in remote
conditions and just in the same region in local conditions. This
difference may be associated with the presence of the sentence
boundary in the remote conditions.
No other regions showed a significant effect of distance. In
particular, at the infinitival to and the verb in the reason clause
(regions 6–7), we again observed no sign of any main effects or
interactions between distance and implicitness. Reading times
were numerically faster in remote vs. local conditions in regions
TABLE 7 | Experiment 4 materials.
Regions of the analysis
Pre-target 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Post-target
ex. loc: The committee interviewed the candidates just in order to find the best person for the job.
im. loc: The candidates were interviewed just in order to find the best person for the job.
ex. rem: The committee interviewed the candidates. The reason was to find the best person for the job.
im. rem: The candidates were interviewed. The reason was to find the best person for the job.
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FIGURE 4 | Mean logged reading times (ms) for all four conditions in regions of interest in Experiment 4.
TABLE 8 | Experiment 4 results.
Region Factors Estimate S.E. t-value p-value
Explicitness −0.053 0.034 −1.57 0.117
3 Distance 0.105 0.034 3.12 0.002
just/The Explicitness × Distance 0.027 0.048 0.58 0.56
Explicitness 0.011 0.026 0.42 0.674
7 Distance −0.048 0.026 −1.81 0.07
find Explicitness × Distance −0.021 0.037 −0.56 0.573
6–9 (to find the best). However, in Experiment 4, these differences
were small and unreliable, eliciting only a marginal effect of
distance in region 7 (β = 0.04, t = 1.8, p ≤ 0.07; all other regions
p = 0.2)7.
Discussion
Experiment 4 examined whether processing differences would be
observed in the resolution of reason clauses in local and remote
control configurations when both local and remote conditions
included a semantic cue for the upcoming reason clause. As the
remote conditions necessarily include such a cue in the phrase
the reason was, in Experiment 4 we included the phrase just in
order in the local conditions to balance both the distance between
7In Experiment 3, we observed a slow-down in reading times at the first word in
the second sentence (“The”) in remote conditions, while the same effect did not
obtain in Experiment 4. Hence, as a reviewer pointed out, it is precisely when
we do not see sentence-boundary effects that we find no advantage for remote
control, as in Experiment 4.Whether this is due to a relationship between sentence-
boundary effects and implicit control, or some incidental difference between the
two experiments, we leave for future investigation.
the target and the reason clause as well as the presence of a
semantic cue for the upcoming reason clause across conditions.
Controlling for both timing and predictiveness in this way, we
observe no reliable differences in reading times in the reason
clause as an effect of whether its target is local or remote, although
we continue to observe a trend in this direction. This suggests
that much of the “remote speed-up” effect that was observed in
Experiments 2 and 3 was due to differences in the extent to which
the upcoming reason clause was cued by the prior context, rather
than differences between the local and remote configurations in
the difficulty of resolving the reason clause.
Because the standard theory proposes different mechanisms
for resolving local and remote control (binding vs. contextual
interpretation), it predicts differences in the processing of these
two configurations; but the pragmatic theory, which proposes
the same mechanism (contextual interpretation), does not. In
Experiment 4 we observe no such differences in the effect of
explicitness on processing of remote vs. local control as reflected
in reading times, and no effect of distance in the reason clause.
Therefore, to the extent that differences in representation should
be reflected as differences in constructing such a representation in
online processing, the absence of such differences in Experiment
4 raise a potential challenge for the standard theorist. As we
discuss in more detail below, several responses are possible on
behalf of the standard theory; it could be that reading times
in particular are not a sensitive enough measure to detect
differences between local and remote control, or that processing
cost more generally does not index whether a dependency is
semantically or pragmatically mediated. To the extent that either
of these responses are adopted, however, they undermine some
earlier arguments in favor of the standard theory.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
In four self-paced reading time experiments, we examined the
processing of infinitival reason clauses, in contexts that favor
anaphoric construals of PRO, their understood subject. In our
materials, the likely referent for PRO is always the individual
who satisfies the deep-S role for the preceding target clause; for
example the interviewer when the target clause has interview
as its verb. We compared explicit control, where this role is
linked to an audible noun phrase, to implicit control, where
it is not. In implicit conditions, the target clause is a short
passive. Already Mauner et al. (1995) made this comparison
in the local configuration, where the reason and target clauses
are syntactically dependent. Ours is the first study to do this
for the remote configuration as well, where the two are in
separate sentences. What we found, in summary, is this. First,
reading times at the reason clause were not longer when the
antecedent was implicit relative to when it was explicit, once we
controlled the length and content of what intervenes between
target and reason clauses across conditions, as in Experiment
4. For local configurations, this agrees with the findings of
Mauner and colleagues. That study too found no significant
differences in relevant regions between implicit and explicit
control, on measures that did distinguish both from cases where,
oﬄine, control is judged unacceptable. Our new finding is that
no such differences are observed in the inter-sentential remote
configuration either, where one might have thought that a costly
pragmatic inferencing operation would be required. Second, we
also did not observe significant main effects of distance between
local and remote control when both the length and the content of
intervening material were matched.
Our results bear on a question of grammatical representation.
When the understood referent of PRO in a reason clause is an
individual mentioned or implied by the target clause, what sort
of relation does PRO have to that clause? Is it syntactically linked
to an argument there? Or is this a kind of discourse anaphora,
with PRO here ranging over a specially restricted domain? On
the standard theory (Roeper, 1987), the same relation underlies
both explicit and implicit control. This much is consistent with
our results, and with those in Mauner et al. (1995), none of
which show any relevant effects of the difference. However, the
standard theory also takes the common relation to be syntactic,
a binding relation between PRO and an argument in the target
clause. Such a syntactic link is possible in the local configuration,
since the reason clause is adjoined to the target clause. But it is
not possible in the remote configuration, since the two clauses are
independent. Therefore, if reason control is syntactic when local,
as the standard theory says, it must have a different analysis when
remote; and if it has the same analysis either way, it cannot be
syntactic, and must in both cases be mediated by discourse. Thus,
given the standard theory of reason control, we expect a main
effect of distance, local vs. remote, on some online measure, while
on a uniformly pragmatic theory we do not. On our reading-
time measure we found no such effect, not once we controlled
for both timing and predictiveness across conditions, as in our
Experiment 4. Thus, our results fail to confirm the standard
theory.
More importantly, the current results subvert the earlier
argument for the standard theory from processing measures.
In past work, both the self-paced-reading-time and the stop-
making-sense task showed no relevant difference between
implicit and explicit control in local configurations (Mauner
et al., 1995), while processing costs were observed in baseline
conditions (intransitives and middles) in which control of
reason clauses appears unacceptable. These data were taken as
evidence that both implicit and explicit control were syntactic
dependencies. We agree that a similar processing profile may
suggest that these are dependencies of the same sort. But the
current work illustrates that these prior data cannot be taken
to argue that both are syntactic dependencies, since remote
control cannot be syntactic, and there too our measures do not
distinguish implicit from explicit control.
While these results thus remove a previous argument in
favor of the standard theory, they challenge the standard theory
directly only if we think that self-paced reading times are sensitive
to the difference between syntactic vs. pragmatic anaphora. But
as discussed in Section Background, they may not be. Indeed,
perhaps these two routes to interpretation are not reliably
distinguished by processing cost (see Cunnings et al., 2014, for
discussion), or any existing measure of processing. In the latter
case there could be no processing evidence for the analysis of
control. However, either observation weakens not only our own
conclusions, but also the earlier defense of the standard theory.
That defense was primarily based on behavioral processing
measures (stop-making-sense task and reading times) that were
not independently demonstrated to distinguish binding from
free anaphora. Hence, our results either provide direct evidence
against the standard theory, or undermine earlier arguments in
its favor, depending on the evidentiary status of reading times.
Our experiments also highlight the importance of several
design factors. Experiment 1 suggested that narrow focus in
target clause can increase reading times in the reason clause,
a construction whose semantics is sensitive to focus (Dretske,
1972). We believe this makes the long-passive a poor baseline
for comparison with implicit control, since normally the by-
phrase carries narrow focus. Experiments 2 and 3 illustrated
the importance of controlling both the length and content of
what comes between the target and reason clauses. Reading times
for the infinitival verb in the reason clause are slower when it
immediately follows the target clause than when it is separated
from the target clause by a buffer, either a temporal adjunct in
local configurations, or the reason was in remote configurations.
This may reflect the time it takes to process the passive target
clause (Chow et al., 2015). Even with a temporal buffer, reading
times were still faster at the infinitive when the buffer is predictive
of a reason clause (the reason was) than when it is not (3 days
ago). Yet reading times at the infinitive did not differ significantly
between remote and local control in Experiment 4, where we
matched the buffers for both length and content, pairing the
reason was in remote conditions with just in order in local
conditions.
To finish, let us turn briefly to the issue of implicit arguments.
Our results undermine earlier arguments in favor of the standard
theory. Although they do not prove an alternative pragmatic
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theory correct, they suggest that further investigation of this kind
of account would be worthwhile. As we note in the introduction,
in a pragmatic theory many of the constraints on control of
reason clauses could be captured by a domain condition that is
not syntactic but conceptual. Anaphoric uses of PRO in a reason
clause denote the individual(s) viewed as responsible for the fact
that the reason clause is meant to explain (Farkas, 1988; Landau,
2000; Williams, 2015). This condition is manifest in cases like
(10), where PRO finds its antecedent in the surface subject of
a passive: the referent of PRO must be viewed as responsible
for what happened (Williams, 1974; Zubizaretta, 1982; Roeper,
1987). To be adequate, such a theory would need to say, for
example, that the referent of a direct object is never viewed
as responsible for the fact expressed by its clause. If it does,
a silent argument in passives would play no role in explaining
implicit control. Having weakened some of the previous
motivation for the standard theory, we suggest that future
research ought to explore such pragmatic alternatives in greater
detail.
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